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Abstract
We should see the debate over the existence of spacetime as a debate
about the fundamentality of spatiotemporal structure to the physical
world. This is a non-traditional conception of the debate, which captures
the spirit of the traditional one. At the same time, it claries the point of
contention between opposing views and offsets worries that the dispute
is stagnant or non-substantive. It also unearths a novel argument for
substantivalism, given current physics. Even so, that conclusion can be
overridden by future physics. I conclude that this debate is a substantive
one, which the substantivalist is currently winning.
1. Introduction
The traditional relational-substantival debate is about whether space—in
modern terms, spacetime—exists. The substantivalist says that it does. The
relationalist says that it doesn’t. According to the relationalist, all that exists, in
the physical world, is material bodies related to one another spatiotemporally;
there is no further thing in which these bodies are located.
This is a debate with a long history. Yet there is still surprisingly little
agreement not only on what is the right answer, but also on how to understand
the very question at issue and the potential answers to it—and even on whether
there is any genuine dispute here. For example, we can try to formulate the
debate in a way that harkens back to the traditional Leibniz-Newton dispute,
as the question of whether space exists as a substantial entity. But then what
it means to call something a substantial entity is disputed, so that it may start
to seem like the two sides are simply talking past each other.
Some people have concluded that the debate is not substantive. Perhaps it
is merely a verbal dispute about which things to call ‘space’ versus ‘matter’,
with no objectively correct answer to be had (Rynasiewicz, 1996). Others have
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thought that the dispute has stagnated or become divorced from physics.1 A
review of the historical dispute and its central examples (Newton’s bucket and
globes, Leibniz’s shifts, Kant’s glove, as well as the more recent hole argument,
all of which live on in today’s discussions) may reasonably suggest a stagnated
debate. Each of these aims to show that the opposing side recognizes either
too few or too many spatiotemporal facts for the physics; but there are various
maneuvers, well hashed-out in the literature, allowing each side to escape the
charge. Relatedly, given the variety of different understandings of the dispute,
you might think that there is no overarching, well-posed question in the
vicinity (Curiel, 2016). David Malament is not alone in wondering whether
there is any clear-cut dispute between the two sides: “Both positions as they
are usually characterized…are terribly obscure. After they are qualied so as
to seem intelligible and not too implausible, it is hard to retain a rm grasp
on what divides them” (1976, 317). Certainly all of this hints at “the fragile
health of the substantival-relational debate” (Belot, 1999, 38).
These are reasonable concerns when leveled at traditional conceptions of
the dispute. Nonetheless, I believe that there is a debate that is substantive,
not stagnant, and relevant to physics. The debate that I will present is not
exactly the traditional one. But it is close enough in spirit that I think it is the
best way of understanding that dispute, updated to take into account more
recent developments in physics and philosophy. And once we frame the debate
in this way, we unearth a novel argument for substantivalism, given current
physics. At the same time, that conclusion could be overridden by future
physics. A seemingly subtle shift yields surprising progress on a longstanding
issue that many people feel has stagnated.
In the following section, I discuss an idea that will play a central role:
structure in general, and spatiotemporal structure in particular. I will argue
that, regardless of whether you are a relationalist or substantivalist, you should
think that there are objective, determinate spatiotemporal facts about a world:
you should be a realist about spatiotemporal structure in my sense. This
follows from a general principle we rely on in physics. (The traditional debate
was about the existence of space and time separately. I discuss the question
of spacetime, or spatiotemporal structure, updating things to the terms of
1Claims that the traditional debate is non-substantive, unclear, or removed from physics,
either in certain contexts or in general, can be found in Stein (1970, 1977b); Malament (1976);
Horwich (1978); Friedman (1983, 221-23); Earman (1989); DiSalle (1994); Leeds (1995);
Rynasiewicz (1996, 2000); Belot and Earman (2001, sec. 10.7); Dorato (2000, 2008); Pooley
(2013, sec. 6.1, 7); Curiel (2016); Slowik (2016). Earman (1989) advocates the need for a
tertium quid.
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modern physics.) In section 3, I will argue that, regardless of whether you are
a relationalist or a substantivalist, you can be a realist about spatiotemporal
structure. I do this by framing the debate in terms of fundamentality and
ground, notions that have gotten lots of press recently in metaphysics. I
show that this way of putting things captures traditional conceptions of the
dispute, while allowing us to formulate the most plausible—if not entirely
traditional—versions of the two main positions on it. (Although I put things
in terms of ground, what’s most important is that we make use of some notion
of relative fundamentality.) Finally (sections 4-5), I put all the pieces together
to show that there is a powerful argument for substantivalism, or at least a
powerful challenge to relationalism, given much of current physics.
At the end, I briey discuss how the conclusion in favor of substantivalism
may change with future developments in physics. Yet however the physics
turns out, the question of relationalism versus substantivalism should be settled
by means of the new type of argument offered here. If I am right, therefore,
the substantivity of the debate is secured regardless of future developments in
physics, while the conclusion in favor of one view or the other will ultimately
be decided by the physics.
2. Spatiotemporal structure and the matching principle
I’ll begin by arguing that both the relationalist and the substantivalist should
posit enough, and not too many, spatiotemporal facts for the physics. As I
will put it, they both should countenance the spatiotemporal structure that is
needed for the physics. (In the next section I turn to whether they both can do
this.) I argue that there is a certain methodological principle we are used to
relying on in physics, even if it is not usually mentioned. This principle guides
our inferences from the mathematical formulation of a theory to the nature
of the world according to the theory. I show by example that we do generally,
and successfully, rely on this principle. The conclusion about spatiotemporal
structure will follow from it.
Consider classical Newtonian mechanics. What does this theory tell us
about the world? Newton thought it tells us that absolute space, a space that
persists through time, exists. He argued that phenomena involving inertial
(unaccelerated) and non-inertial (accelerated, in particular rotated) motion
reveal this. (Think of his bucket experiment and the spinning globes example.)
Although we nowadays agree that the phenomena indicate a real distinction
between inertial and non-inertial motion, we think that Newton was wrong
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about what’s required to account for this distinction.
In today’s terms, Newton was arguing for substantivalism about what is
often called Aristotelian, or Newtonian, spacetime.2 This spacetime has the
structure to support Newton’s idea of absolute space, for it has structure that
identies spatial locations over time. But we now know (as Newton did not)
that Galilean, or neo-Newtonian, spacetime also supports the distinction
between accelerated and unaccelerated motion, without absolute space.
Spelling this out. Aristotelian spacetime has all the structure of Galilean
spacetime, but it also has absolute space, or an absolute standard of rest or
preferred rest frame. To remind you of what this means, think of an observer
on a platform and another observer on a train moving with constant velocity
relative to the platform. Each observer feels that he or she is at rest and that
the other is moving. Galilean spacetime says that neither one is “correct” or
at rest in any absolute, observer-independent sense. Each is simply in motion
relative to the other, and at rest in her own frame of reference. (Think of a
reference frame as a coordinate system attached to an observer, representing
her own point of view.) According to an Aristotelian spatiotemporal structure,
there is an observer- or frame-independent fact, from among all the observers
in constant relative motion, about which one is at rest in an absolute, frame-
independent sense—namely, the one at rest in absolute space. For there is
a frame-independent fact about whether a given spatial location is the same
location over time, so that an object located there is at absolute rest. In other
words, there is a preferred rest frame: the one that’s at rest with respect to
absolute space.
Intuitively, an Aristotelian spatiotemporal structure has more structure than
a Galilean one. It has all the same structure, plus an additional absolute-space,
or absolute-velocity, structure. It recognizes all the same spatiotemporal facts,
but it also says that there are facts about how fast an object is moving with
respect to absolute space.
It turns out that these additional facts are not needed for, or recognized
by, the physics here. Newton’s laws are the same in any inertial frame—they
are invariant under changes in inertial frame—which means that they can be
formulated without mentioning or presupposing a preferred frame. Since a
preferred frame isn’t needed in the mathematical formulation of the laws, we
infer that it doesn’t correspond to anything physical in the world. An absolute
standard of rest isn’t part of the theory’s, or world’s, spatiotemporal structure.
2Not to be confused with the spacetime that Earman (1989, 2.6) discusses under this
heading.
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The physics does not recognize objective, frame-independent facts about
what velocity an object has. Conclusion: Aristotelian spacetime has excess,
superuous structure, as far as Newton’s laws are concerned. It recognizes
more spatiotemporal facts than the laws do.
These laws do recognize facts about objects’ accelerations (as Newton
argued). Think of Newton’s rst law: an object travels with uniform veloc-
ity unless acted on by a net external force. This law assumes that there is
a distinction between accelerated and unaccelerated motion, since it tells
things to behave differently depending on whether they are accelerating or
not. In terms of spatiotemporal geometry, the law assumes a distinction
between straight and curved trajectories or paths through spacetime, with
the straight ones corresponding to inertial motion, the curved ones to non-
inertial motion. And Galilean spacetime has the structure to support this
distinction. It has an afne connection, or inertial structure, which provides a
standard of straightness for these trajectories. We might put it like this: this
spatiotemporal structure supports a notion or quantity of absolute accelera-
tion but not of absolute velocity—“absolute” not in Newton’s sense, which
assumes the existence of absolute space, but in the sense of being invariant or
frame-independent.3
All of this suggests that a Galilean spatiotemporal structure is the right
structure for Newton’s physics. This is the structure that’s required for,
or presupposed by, the dynamical laws; the structure that recognizes the
spatiotemporal facts that the laws do.4 Newton was wrong to think that a
classical world must contain absolute space and a concomitant quantity of
absolute velocity: the physics doesn’t require it. (If the laws were not invariant
under changes in inertial frame, then we would infer that extra structure. Such
laws would implicitly refer to a preferred frame.) Notice that we reached
this conclusion about the structure needed for the laws independently of the
relationalist-substantivalist debate, an idea that I will return to soon.5
3I believe that this sense evades Rynasiewicz’s (2000) arguments against the clarity of any
absolute/relative distinction.
4Although the inference to a Galilean structure is now relatively standard (Earman (1970);
Stein (1970); Huggett (1999, 194-5); Maudlin (2012, ch. 3)), there is room for debate.
Saunders (2013) and Knox (2014), in different ways, argue that Newtonian physics requires
a different structure. I continue as though the above inference is correct. It is in any case
agreed that absolute space is not needed, and whatever structure is required, the example
illustrates our reliance on the upcoming principle.
5A similar point is made by Stein (1970, 271-2), although he goes on to say that, “the
question whether…this structure of space-time also ‘really exists’, surely seems to be su-
pererogatory” (277). In a way I agree, but I also think that there remains a substantive
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First let me say a bit about “structure.” On my understanding (and as it is
often used in physics and mathematical physics),6 structure has to do with the
invariant features or quantities, which are the same in all allowable reference
frames or coordinate systems. Inertial structure, for example, is part of a
classical spatiotemporal structure: there is an absolute, frame-independent
notion of accelerated versus unaccelerated motion. But there is no “absolute
velocity structure.” An object’s velocity depends on the inertial frame we use
to describe it. Since Newton’s laws are invariant under changes in inertial
frame, we infer that the choice of frame is an arbitrary choice in description,
and that any quantity depending on that choice, like velocity, is merely frame-
dependent, not out there in the world apart from that choice.
Similarly, we think that a choice of origin is just an arbitrary choice in
description, not corresponding to genuine structure in the world. Choose
a coordinate system with a different origin, and the laws always remain the
same. Since the laws are invariant under changes in origin—they “say the
same thing”7 regardless—we infer that this choice is merely a conventional
or arbitrary choice in description. There is no preferred-location structure
in the world, no coordinate-independent fact about whether a given point is
“really” the origin. By contrast, the laws of Aristotle’s physics are not invariant
in this way. According to them, there is a preferred-location structure in the
world—a location toward which certain elements naturally fall and away from
which others naturally rise—and preferred coordinate systems for describing
this structure, namely those with an origin at that location.
We likewise think that different choices of unit of measure are conventional
or arbitrary choices in description. Change from feet to meters or some other
unit for measuring distances, for instance, and the physics always remains the
same. Since the physics says the same thing regardless, we infer that there is
no “preferred-unit-of-measure structure” in the world.
As I see it, structure corresponds to the intrinsic, genuine, objective fea-
tures or quantities, which don’t depend on arbitrary or conventional choices
in description. By contrast, frame-, coordinate-, or unit-dependent quan-
tities depend to some extent on our arbitrary or conventional choices in
description—arbitrary, since according to the physics any choice is equally
legitimate. Such quantities aren’t wholly about the world as it is in itself, but
are in part about our descriptions of the world. Whereas structural features
dispute.
6More is in North (2009).
7Brading and Castellani (2007) discuss different ways of spelling out this idea.
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are agreed upon by all the allowable descriptions, and so correspond to gen-
uine features of the world apart from any of those descriptions. No matter
which description you use, after all, you get the same result.
Spatiotemporal structure in particular concerns the intrinsic, genuine, ob-
jective spatiotemporal features of a world, which don’t depend on arbitrary or
conventional choices—that two objects are separated by some amount under
a Euclidean metric, say, or that a particle’s trajectory is straight according to a
given inertial structure. Notice that this idea of structure is neutral between
substantivalism and relationalism. Both of these views can recognize that
there is a distinction between spatiotemporal facts that are more objective,
and those that are frame-, observer-, unit-, or coordinate-relative.
We are still working up to the general principle. Here’s an idea that we
have reached so far, which will motivate the principle. As we can see from the
inference to a Galilean structure for Newton’s laws, any physical theory will
constrain, or help dictate, a world’s spatiotemporal structure. We infer the
structure from the physics in this way. This is because any theory will require
or presuppose a certain spatiotemporal structure. In particular, it will require
the structure needed to support the laws, in that the laws cannot be stated or
formulated without assuming it—they wouldn’t make sense without it.8
Two examples illustrate this. Recall Newton’s rst law, which tells objects
to behave differently depending on whether they are traveling inertially, with
uniform velocity, or not. This law would not make sense if there weren’t a
distinction between uniform and accelerated motion: it presupposes it. So the
world must be such that there is this distinction. The world’s spatiotemporal
structure should distinguish between inertial and non-inertial trajectories.
Assuming that the laws are about the objective nature of the world, there must
be objective facts about whether objects are traveling inertially or not.9
Consider a different example that I’ll return to later. If the laws are not
time reversal invariant—if they “look different” when we ip the direction
of time, swapping past and future—then this suggests a structural, physical
distinction in the world between the two temporal directions. Newton’s laws
are symmetric in this sense: any behavior allowed by the theory can also
happen backward in time. The lm of any Newtonian process (a ball thrown
in the air, billiard balls colliding), run backward, also depicts a process that
evolves with the laws. These laws don’t distinguish past versus future: they say
8Consider Earman’s statement that, “laws of motion cannot be written on thin air alone
but require the support of various space-time structures” (1989, 46).
9Compare Maudlin (2012, 9-12); Pooley (2013, sec. 3).
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the same thing regardless of the direction of time. By contrast, the second law
of thermodynamics says that entropy increases to the future, not the past: gases
expand, ice melts, not the reverse. A reverse-running lm shows something
disallowed by the law. Non-time reversal invariant laws like this mention or
presuppose the distinction between past and future, telling things to behave
differently depending on the direction of time. Such laws would not make
sense if there weren’t a past-future distinction in the world, corresponding to
an asymmetric temporal structure, or objective facts about past versus future:
they presuppose it. (If you are worried about this conclusion in the case of
the second law, stay tuned: I return to it at the end.)
Finally, the principle. The above examples are familiar instances of how
we draw certain conclusions about the physical world from the laws that
govern it. These examples all suggest that we rely on a certain methodological
principle, which says to posit in the world the structure that’s presupposed by
the laws. We generally posit physical structure in the world corresponding to
the mathematical structure needed to formulate the laws—such as a Galilean
spatiotemporal structure for Newton’s laws, an asymmetric temporal structure
for non-time reversal invariant laws, or a preferred-location structure for
Aristotle’s laws. We infer to the world whatever the laws presuppose, whatever
there must be in the world for the laws to make sense and be true of it. There
should be a match in structure between the laws and the world. Theories
obeying what I will call the matching principle are “well-tuned,” to borrow a
phrase that John Earman (1989, ch. 3) uses for a somewhat different idea.10 (I
take it this is motivated by a kind of realism. I won’t argue for realism here.)
As with any guiding methodological principle, this principle won’t yield
conclusive inferences, yet it is still a reasonable guide. We cannot be certain
that there is no absolute space in a Newtonian world, but it is reasonable to
infer that there isn’t. Or take special relativity. The matching principle lies
behind the thought that there is no preferred simultaneity frame. Since the
laws are invariant under changes in Lorentz frame, we infer that there is no
absolute, frame-independent simultaneity relation. We can’t be certain about
this, and some people argue that we have other reasons to posit this structure
(for presentism or for certain theories of quantum mechanics, for example).
Still, we do generally, and reasonably, rely on this principle. We take it to be
successful. As the case of special relativity shows, we need an extra reason to
disobey it. To put it another way: all things being equal, we should infer a
10Earman suggests that there should be a match between the symmetries of the laws and
of the spacetime, as a condition of adequacy on theories.
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match in structure between laws and world. Those who believe in a mismatch
are saying that other things are not equal, and must argue as much.11
It is sometimes said that the reason to posit a Galilean rather than Aris-
totelian structure in a Newtonian world is that the latter would yield in-
principle undetectable physical facts.12 Since Newton’s laws are invariant
under changes in inertial frame, no experiment could ever detect which is the
preferred frame. Choose any frame in which to run your experiment, and the
laws always predict the same results. That’s right. But I think that there is a
deeper reason for the inference to a Galilean structure, which is the match
between the mathematical structure of the theory and the physical structure
of the world. This match is part of our evidence that we have inferred the
correct structure of the world. This is a more fundamental reason for the
inference than the vericationist-sounding principle to avoid undetectable
physical facts.
I have argued that the matching principle is a core methodological princi-
ple we use to guide our inferences from a physical theory to the nature of the
world according to that theory. Now we can see that this principle tells us
to posit, or countenance, or somehow be able to talk about, spatiotemporal
structure. For the laws generally talk about, they mention or presuppose, a
particular spatiotemporal structure. We should countenance the particular
spatiotemporal structure or facts required for the laws; ipso facto, we should
countenance spatiotemporal structure or facts in general. In other words,
the matching principle says that we should be realists about spatiotemporal
structure, since the laws presuppose such a thing, and we should generally
posit in the world the structure that’s presupposed by the laws.
Importantly, this conclusion is independent of the relational-substantival
debate. Regardless of your position on that debate, the matching principle tells
you to believe that there are objective facts about the spatiotemporal structure
of a world; to recognize the spatiotemporal facts that are recognized by the
laws. You should believe that a Newtonian world has a Galilean spatiotemporal
structure, for example (although this claim may be understood differently by
the relationalist and substantivalist, as I discuss below). Who would reject
the principle? The conventionalist, for one, like Reichenbach or Poincaré,
who denies that there is an objective fact about the “right” spatiotemporal
structure of a world: there are no objective spatiotemporal facts. Against such
11Those who argue from quantum mechanics aren’t proposing a mismatch, but that the
laws of quantum mechanics trump special relativity when it comes to inferring this structure.
12Mentioned, with varying support, in Earman (1989, ch. 3), Ismael and van Fraassen
(2003), Roberts (2008), Dasgupta (2009), Maudlin (2012, ch. 3), Pooley (2013, secs. 3-4).
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a view, the matching principle suggests that spatiotemporal structure is out
there in the world. It is not conventional or arbitrarily chosen, as is an inertial
frame or origin or unit of measure.13 This structure exists; it is part of reality.
There is an objective, determinate fact about what spatiotemporal structure a
world has, evidenced by its laws.
(The matching principle is not Quine’s criterion for ontological commit-
ment. Quine says that we are ontologically committed to what the variables
of our theories must range over in order for those theories to be true. This
has to do with ontology, with what entities exist. The matching principle is
about what structure we should posit. It says to align physical structure in the
world with the mathematical structure required to formulate the laws. This
has to do with what spatiotemporal facts we should recognize, which is not
simply a matter of ontology. To see that these come apart, notice rst that
a given spatiotemporal structure, say a Galilean one, can be understood by
different people as involving different entities: by a certain substantivalist14 as
involving points of spacetime and a relationalist as involving material bodies.
[As Tim Maudlin puts it, to attribute “a mathematical structure to physical
items” is to say that those items “have some physical features that make them
amenable to precise mathematical description in some respects” (2015). In
particular, it is not yet to say what the items must be.] Second, two people
might agree on what entities exist—say, points of spacetime—but disagree on
the spatiotemporal structure, for instance on whether the points are arranged
in a Galilean or Aristotelian way. This will become clearer as we proceed.)
Question: how should we formulate the laws? It seems as though different
formulations can presuppose different structures. If so, then in order to adhere
to the matching principle, we will rst need to know how to formulate the
laws, which is a big question. Trust me for now that we can make progress in
advance of answering this question. I will return to it at the end.
Some have argued for a third view, neither substantivalist nor relationalist,
called ‘structural spacetime realism.’15 Since that view emphasizes realism
about spacetime structure, you might think that it is what I am advocating.
13We can agree with Reichenbach and Poincaré that those things are arbitrary, since
the laws indicate that different choices are equally legitimate. Spatiotemporal structure is
different. We cannot arbitrarily alter the metric, for instance, and keep the laws the same,
not without major compensating changes elsewhere.
14See section 3.3.
15Different versions are in Dorato (2000, 2008); Slowik (2005); Bain (2006); Esfeld and
Lam (2008); Ladyman and Ross (2009).
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I don’t have space to address the alternative in detail,16 but I will note that,
despite supercial similarities, it is importantly different from my overall ap-
proach. First, I claim that both the relationalist and the substantivalist should
(and can: below) be realists about spatiotemporal structure, whereas spacetime
structural realism aims to be distinct from either of those views. Second, I
understand the idea of spatiotemporal structure differently, to encompass any
objective, intrinsic spatiotemporal fact about a world. In particular, coun-
tenancing spatiotemporal structure in my sense does not mean eschewing
fundamental physical objects (alternatively, intrinsic properties) altogether,
nor the possibility of our knowing about such things, as the structural space-
time realist often seems to do. That said, below we will see one way in which
my account mirrors certain claims of the spacetime structural realist.
3. A disagreement about ground
In order to say that the relationalist and substantivalist both should counte-
nance spatiotemporal structure, I must be able to say that they both can do
this. You might wonder: how can the relationalist believe in spatiotemporal
structure? Isn’t this the very sort of thing the relationalist rejects? On the
other hand, if the relationalist can believe in spatiotemporal structure, you
might then wonder what could be left for the two views to disagree about.
I’ll now suggest that the notion of ground gives the sense in which the
relationalist as well as the substantivalist can countenance spatiotemporal
structure, and that this yields a real disagreement that’s relevant to physics.
The basic idea will be this. Both views can countenance, or believe in the
existence of, spatiotemporal structure. (Whether each one is able to recognize
the particular structure needed for the laws is a question that I will be sidestep-
ping here, for reasons to come.) The views differ on what underlies this
structure. Essentially, the substantivalist says that spatiotemporal structure is
fundamental to the physical world, whereas the relationalist says that it arises
from the relations between and properties of material bodies.
Putting this in terms of ground. A grounding relation is an explanatory
relation that captures the way in which one thing depends on or holds in
virtue of another, without implying that the dependent thing doesn’t exist.
Ground captures a “metaphysical because” in answer to questions about why
something exists or some fact holds. (I use the general idea, without entering
into debates over its metaphysics. I won’t take a stand on whether ground is
16See Greaves (2011).
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properly a relation between facts or objects, but deliberately use both ways
of talking. It is generally thought that the grounding relation is transitive
and irreexive, and that the grounds metaphysically necessitate the grounded.
None of these assumptions have gone uncontested, but I assume them here.17)
Using the notion of ground, the relationalist and substantivalist can each
say that spatiotemporal structure exists, that there are objective spatiotemporal
facts about a world. They disagree on what the spatiotemporal structure holds
in virtue of; what metaphysically explains the spatiotemporal facts. The
relationalist says that a world’s spatiotemporal structure is grounded in the
features and behaviors of material bodies. All the spatiotemporal facts are
grounded in the facts about material bodies. The substantivalist says that
spatiotemporal structure isn’t grounded in anything else more fundamental to
the physical world; in particular, it is not grounded in material bodies. There
are fundamental spatiotemporal facts that are not grounded in facts about
material bodies. Both views can countenance spatiotemporal structure or
facts; they disagree on what, if anything, grounds this structure or those facts.
I spell out the two views more in a moment. First, a few notes on the
use of ground in this context. Jonathan Schaffer (2009, 363) and Shamik
Dasgupta (2011) also suggest that we can understand this debate in terms of
ground, but they put things a little differently. They say that the relationalist
and substantivalist both believe that spacetime exists, while differing on what
grounds the existence of spacetime. I say that both (can and should) believe
that spatiotemporal structure exists, while differing on what grounds the
existence of that structure. I prefer this way of putting things because, we’ll
see, it allows us to esh out the competing views in different ways, all the
while maintaining a genuine dispute that the physics will weigh in on.
It may seem unexciting to exchange a debate about the existence of space-
time for one about the fundamentality of spatiotemporal structure. There
has been much discussion in metaphysics of late about doing a similar kind
of exchange with other existence debates (as in Schaffer (2009)), so that this
instance may feel like old hat. There have been some related thoughts about
the spacetime debate in recent philosophy of physics as well. Thus Carl
Hoefer (1998) frames the question in terms of fundamentality, as that of
how “to understand the basic ontology of the physical world,” although he
formulates aspects of the dispute more traditionally, saying for instance that
substantivalism is committed to the existence of “a substantial, quasi-absolute
17Different accounts are in Fine (2001); Schaffer (2009). Rosen (2010) defends the idea.
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entity.”18 Gordon Belot (1999, 2000, 2011) says that the relationalist, like
the substantivalist, can be a realist in the sense of “attribut[ing] to reality a
determinate spatial structure,” while disagreeing on “the nature of the exis-
tence of space” (2011, 1).19 This is close to my own way of putting things,
although his account is not spelled out in the same way (it does not use notions
like ground or my conception of spatiotemporal structure, and it focuses on
certain traditional examples), nor does he draw the same conclusions. The
more prevalent attitude in philosophy of physics, especially among those who
complain about the substantivity of the dispute, is that the debate concerns
the existence question. So although the current understanding of the dispute
is not without precedent, even then there are differences, and it is anyway not
the prevalent viewpoint. If you disagree with that assessment, though, it will
soon be clear that novel avenues of argument open up once we are completely
explicit about this shift.
3.1. Relationalism in terms of ground
The relationalist says that certain material bodies, and various of their prop-
erties and relations, are fundamental, and a world’s spatiotemporal structure
holds in virtue of them. All spatiotemporal structure or facts are grounded
in (facts about) material bodies. In saying that “certain material bodies are
fundamental,” this means whichever material objects turn out to be most
fundamental: certain particles, say. (I assume the fundamental relations can
include spatiotemporal ones, although the relationalist might want a different
kind of relation to be fundamental, causal ones being a familiar candidate.20 I
leave this open here. The upcoming argument takes aim at all these versions
of relationalism equally.21)
So, for example, the fact that a world has a Euclidean spatial structure
is grounded in, holds in virtue of, the fact that its particles are, and can be,
arranged in various ways, with various distance relations between them. (I
return to this “can be” phrase soon.) The world has a Euclidean structure
because (in the metaphysical sense) its particles are, and can be, arranged in
18Hoefer similarly argues that this is a substantive dispute, which is likely to remain so
with future physics, and that general relativity supports substantivalism. Yet he puts various
things differently from how I do, drawing these conclusions for different reasons.
19Belot also says that this formulation, while unorthodox, yields a debate that is substantive,
relevant to physics, and reminiscent of the traditional dispute.
20See for example Nerlich (1994a, ch. 1).
21I also assume that the objects and relations are equally fundamental, though there may
be a view with only one fundamental “ontological category” in the sense of Paul (2013).
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those ways; this is what the spatial structure consists in. Similarly, the fact
that a Newtonian world has a Galilean spatiotemporal structure is grounded
in the fact that its particles do, and can, behave in various ways, with various
spatiotemporal relations between them. The fact that a world has a particular
spatiotemporal structure is made true by the facts about material bodies. A
world has the spatiotemporal structure it does because material bodies (can)
behave in certain ways.
Three notes on this use of ground. First, a grounding explanation is
importantly different from a causal explanation. In Kit Fine’s words, ground
yields “a distinctive kind of metaphysical explanation,” in which the objects or
facts are connected by “some constitutive form of determination” (2012, 37).
Particle behaviors don’t cause a Euclidean spatial structure. This is rather
what the spatial structure consists in or depends on, in a metaphysical sense.
Compare this to more familiar cases, such as the grounding of facts about the
macroscopic world in facts about subatomic particles, or the grounding of
mental facts in non-mental facts, or moral facts in non-moral facts. Ground
captures this metaphysical “in virtue of” explanation.22 As I understand it,
when we say that “the fact that x grounds the fact that y,” this just means that
“the fact that y holds in virtue of the fact that x”; i.e., that the holding of the
grounded fact consists in nothing more than the holding of the grounding
fact.
Second, ground aims to give a “looser” connection between the facts or
objects involved than that given by a denition. An analogy. I am thinking of
ground in such a way that it can articulate the view that the biological facts
are nothing over and above the facts about these systems’ particles. (You may
not hold such a view, but ground can specify what it amounts to.) The history
of failed attempts in twentieth-century philosophy of science to spell out a
“tighter” connection between the reduced and reducing facts by means of
correspondence rules that dene the biological quantities in terms of physical
ones suggests that this won’t work. Yet there is still a way of capturing the sense
in which the biological facts “are nothing but” the physical facts, which is to
say that the biological facts are grounded in the physical ones. In an analogous
way, the relationalist can say that the facts about spatiotemporal structure are
“nothing but”—are grounded in—the facts about material bodies, even if she
can’t explicitly dene the spatiotemporal structure in terms of the relations
between material bodies. A grounding relation can hold even in the absence
of a denitional connection. (This is one reason the notion of ground can help
22Loewer (2001) discusses the relevant sense of “in virtue of.”
14
the relationalist, since nding such explicit denitions is notoriously difcult.
Of course, it is not easy to give an account of the grounding of spatiotemporal
structure in material bodies either, but replacing the denitional requirement
with the looser constraints of ground can ease some of the burden.)
Third, there must be some account of how the facts that the relational-
ist takes to be fundamental manage to ground all the spatiotemporal facts
needed for the physics. (For instance, there can’t be two worlds with the same
fundamental relationalist facts but different spatiotemporal structures, since
the fundamental facts necessitate the grounded facts.) Simply being a realist
about spatiotemporal structure does not guarantee the ability to generate the
particular structure required by the laws as the matching principle demands.
You might be skeptical that the relationalist can do this. Much of the literature
is taken up with this question of how, and whether, the relationalist’s more
meager ontology can recognize all the spatiotemporal facts we want.23
This is a big question, but I won’t try to answer it here. I won’t try to
tell you exactly how the relationalist grounds all the spatiotemporal facts in
facts about material bodies.24 As we’ll see, I think there is an argument for
substantivalism that goes through even if we grant the relationalist the ability
to ground all the relevant facts in ones she takes to be fundamental. So for the
purposes of that argument, I am going to grant the relationalist that ability.
It is worth mentioning one thing that I do think will be required to ground
that structure, which is some version of “modal relationalism.” I suspect
that the relationalist will have to countenance facts not only about the actual
features and behaviors of material bodies, but about their possible ones as
well—facts about what spatiotemporal relations can hold, in some sense. This
is because the actually instantiated relations won’t in general sufce to x
the full spatiotemporal structure required for the physics. (As long as the
relationalist can embed the actual relations uniquely into a certain structure,
it seems as though she can talk of the spatiotemporal structure of a world.
The problem is that the actual relations may not uniquely x the structure
[up to isomorphism] needed for making predictions about material bodies.25)
In order to adhere to the matching principle, the relationalist will have to
23A repeated complaint against the varieties of relationalism surveyed by Pooley (2013) is
that the relationalist’s resources are too thin to yield predictions of the phenomena.
24From this perspective, those such as Manders (1982), Mundy (1983, 1992), Huggett
(2006), Belot (2011) can be seen as giving accounts of how this grounding project might go.
25Examples are in Mundy (1986); Maudlin (1993, 193-94, 199-200); Nerlich (1994a); Belot
(2000, 2011, ch. 2). Field (1984) argues that the modal view is necessary for the relationalist
to solve the problem of quantity. An alternative is conventionalism (Earman, 1989, 8.6).
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go modal. I refer you to Carolyn Brighouse (1999) and Belot (2011) for
discussion of ways the relationalist might do this and what sort of modality
may be involved.26
(Modal relationalism arguably allows the view to countenance vacuum
worlds, which seem possible according to both classical and relativistic physics.
Such worlds contain no material bodies and yet can have a spatiotemporal
structure. Now, it is open to to the relationalist to deny that vacuum models
correspond to physically possible worlds. Nonetheless, the modal relationalist
should be able to allow for these possibilities. All the facts about spatiotem-
poral structure will still be grounded in facts about material bodies—in facts
about how these bodies would behave, if there were any. Such a relationalist
can arguably even countenance different spatiotemporal structures in differ-
ent vacuum worlds, as general relativity seems to allow for. This is not to
say exactly how the relationalist can do this, just as I haven’t said how the
relationalist can ground any particular structure in material bodies. Yet once
we grant the [modal] relationalist the ability to ground all the spatiotemporal
facts in facts about material bodies, there needn’t be a special problem for
vacuum worlds.)
Keep in mind that the relationalist might not deny the fundamentality of
any spatiotemporal fact or structure. Depending on the version of the view
(see the beginning of this subsection), the fundamental facts may include
ones such as that two particles are separated by some distance, or that one
particle lies between two others.27 What’s important is that the relationalist
only allows certain kinds of spatiotemporal facts (if any) to be fundamental,
namely those that essentially involve material bodies and their relations—facts
that the substantivalist takes to be nonfundamental. The fact that a world
has a given spatiotemporal structure is grounded in the facts about material
bodies, even though these latter facts may include certain spatiotemporal
ones. More exactly: there is no fundamental spatiotemporal fact or structure
apart from the structure of, or facts about, material bodies. (Since some
spatiotemporal facts or structure may be fundamental, hence ungrounded
[assuming that fundamental facts are ungrounded, which some dispute].)
For ease of exposition, I put this as the claim that all spatiotemporal facts
26The view may sound newfangled, but even Leibniz, according to many, held it: Belot
(2011, Appendix D). The liberalized relationalism of Teller (1991) is a precursor to more
recent versions. See also Sklar (1974, III.B2); Horwich (1978); Mundy (1986). Objections
are in Malament (1976); Field (1984); Earman (1989, 6.12); Nerlich (1994a).
27Which of these depends on whether the relationalist thinks that fundamental relations
can be quantitative.
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are grounded in facts about material bodies. All spatiotemporal structure is
grounded in the relations between and properties of material bodies.
So: using the notion of ground, the relationalist can say that there are facts
about a world’s spatiotemporal structure, which are distinct from the facts
about material bodies and their relations, but are also nothing over and above
those facts about material bodies—just as one might say that there are real
facts about macroscopic systems, which are distinct from the facts about their
particles, but are also nothing over and above the facts about the particles.
This is a non-standard (if not wholly unprecedented) way of formulat-
ing relationalism, which captures traditional thoughts about the view, for
instance that spacetime doesn’t “really exist”: “spacetime” is nothing but
various features of material bodies; certain material bodies are fundamental,
and any spatiotemporal talk or fact is really about them. At the same time,
this formulation allows the relationalist to say that spatiotemporal structure
exists, there are objective truths about what spatiotemporal structure a world
has, as the matching principle says we should do. It’s just that these things all
hold in virtue of what’s true about material bodies.
3.2. Substantivalism in terms of ground
The substantivalist denies that all spatiotemporal facts hold in virtue of facts
about material bodies. A world’s spatiotemporal structure is not grounded in
features and behaviors of material bodies. The fact that a world has a given
spatiotemporal structure is a fundamental fact about the physical world; in
particular, it is not grounded in facts about material bodies. (Clarications
below.) The facts about a world’s spatiotemporal structure, in turn, ground
the facts about the spatiotemporal relations between material bodies. (The
former may only partially ground the latter, since the grounds may include
occupation relations that material bodies bear to spacetime points or regions,
depending on the version of the view: section 3.3.)
For example, the fact that two particles are some distance apart is grounded
in, made true by, the fact that they are separated by that amount according to
the fundamental metric structure (where the metric will itself be understood
in different ways by different substantivalists—see section 3.3—but will in any
case not be grounded in features of material bodies). The fact that a particle is
traveling inertially in a Newtonian world is likewise grounded in facts about
the fundamental spatiotemporal structure: the particle is following a straight
trajectory because (in the metaphysical sense) its path is straight according to
the world’s Galilean structure. (The substantivalist then recognizes nonfun-
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damental spatiotemporal facts or structure of a sort, about the spatiotemporal
relations between material bodies. More exactly, the view holds that there are
fundamental spatiotemporal facts or structure not grounded in [facts about]
material bodies. Notice that certain facts about material bodies, for instance
about their fundamental intrinsic properties, will be fundamental. What’s
not fundamental are the spatiotemporal facts about them.) By contrast, for
the relationalist, a world’s spatiotemporal structure is Galilean because the
particles behave in certain ways. On that view, the facts about material bodies
metaphysically explain the fact that a world has the given structure.
For the substantivalist, facts about the spatiotemporal relations between
material bodies are nothing over and above facts about how these objects are
arranged according to a given spatiotemporal structure. Facts about a world’s
spatiotemporal structure, on the other hand, are not grounded in facts about
material bodies, and in that way are “over and above” any facts about material
bodies. This captures the traditional conception of the view as holding that
spacetime exists “independently of” material bodies: there is spatiotemporal
structure that is not metaphysically due to material bodies.
You may worry that this conception of substantivalism is already discon-
rmed by our current best theory of spacetime. According to general relativity,
the presence of matter affects the local spatiotemporal geometry, which in
turn affects the behavior of matter; whereas on my conception of substanti-
valism, there is spatiotemporal structure that is independent of matter. This
worry is evaded by noticing that the inter-dependence between spatiotemporal
structure and material bodies in general relativity is of a different, causal or
nomological, kind from that given by ground. Although the substantivalist
says that there is spatiotemporal structure that is independent of material bod-
ies in not being grounded in them—these facts about spatiotemporal structure
are “metaphysically over and above” the facts about material bodies—she can
still allow that the behavior of material bodies causes a certain spatiotemporal
structure in accord with the physical laws. Compare: although the dualist
says that mental events are not grounded in physical events—mental events
are “metaphysically over and above” physical ones—she can still allow that
physical events cause mental events in accord with the scientic laws.
Substantivalism and relationalism, as I understand them, disagree about the
fundamental nature of the physical world. They both countenance spatiotemporal
structure or facts, but disagree on whether all such structure or facts hold in
virtue of material bodies. Both views can recognize the fact that two particles
are separated by some distance under a Euclidean metric, for instance, or that
a world has a Euclidean metric structure. But they will disagree on whether
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the metric is itself fundamental or grounded in the behavior of material bodies.
To borrow a phrase that Helen Beebee uses for a different debate, these views
“have completely opposite conceptions of what provides the metaphysical
basis for what” (2000, 580). The substantivalist sees a world’s spatiotemporal
structure as the metaphysical basis for the spatiotemporal relations between
material bodies. The relationalist sees material bodies and their relations as
the metaphysical basis for a world’s spatiotemporal structure. If we ask, of a
Newtonian world, “why (in the metaphysical sense) does it have a Galilean
spatiotemporal structure?”, the relationalist will answer: “because the particles
(can) behave thus and so.” The substantivalist will have no answer (or if there is
any answer, it won’t reference material bodies: see below). This is a substantive
debate about what makes it the case that the spatiotemporal structure needed
for the physics holds.
3.3. Further clarications
The substantivalist might not take a world’s spatiotemporal structure to be
absolutely fundamental. Newton held that absolute space is a necessary
consequence of God’s existence, so that the facts about the world’s spatial
structure are not fundamental but grounded in facts about God. Yet Newton
is still a substantivalist, on my understanding, since the facts about the spatial
structure are more fundamental than the facts about bodies’ spatial relations.28
To put it another way: the facts about the spatial structure are fundamental to
the physical realm. Analogously, the relationalist will say that all spatiotemporal
facts are grounded in facts about material bodies, regardless of her other
metaphysical views, such as whether there is something yet-more-fundamental
that lies outside the physical realm. The views still disagree over whether
spatiotemporal structure apart from material bodies is fundamental to the
physical world. For ease of presentation, I continue to put the dispute as the
question of whether spatiotemporal structure is fundamental (to the physical
world).
What if there is no fundamental physical level? In that case, the views
might still be distinguished by means of the relative fundamentality of the
behaviors of material bodies and a world’s spatiotemporal structure, depending
on the details. This may suggest that the debate should be framed in terms
of relative fundamentality. Substantivalism would then be the view that the
facts about a world’s spatiotemporal structure are more fundamental than the
spatiotemporal facts about material bodies, and relationalism would be the
28Some argue that Newton wasn’t a substantivalist: Stein (1970); DiSalle (2002).
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view that the facts about material bodies are more fundamental than the facts
about spatiotemporal structure. But I don’t want to put it this way. That way
of putting things would imply that either relationalism or substantivalism
is bound to be true, regardless of future physics, so long as the two kinds
of facts are not equally fundamental. Yet intuitively, if nothing like either
spatiotemporal structure or material bodies turns out to be fundamental to the
physical world, then neither view has been vindicated. You could insist that
substantivalism would still be correct so long as the facts about the world’s
spatiotemporal structure are more fundamental than the spatiotemporal facts
about material bodies, and contrariwise for relationalism. This strikes me
as too far removed from the original views. More generally, I don’t think
that one of these views must be correct regardless of future physics, and it
will depend on the details of that future physics whether one or the other, or
neither, is correct.
There is another way to put the difference between the views, which I want
to be careful with. The substantivalist says that there exists a fundamental
physical space(time); the relationalist denies this. Similarly: the relationalist
denies, whereas the substantivalist accepts, the existence of spacetime points
(or regions) as fundamental physical objects. This way of putting things is
familiar and in keeping with traditional conceptions of the dispute.29 The
problem is that it is not entirely clear what it means to say that a physical
space—this “peculiar entity” (Belot and Earman, 2001, 227)—does, or doesn’t,
exist; relatedly, whether spacetime points or regions exist as concrete entities.
I suspect that this is an underlying reason for the unclarity of the debate
in many people’s minds, especially in the philosophy of physics community.
Some philosophers of physics have worried about taking spacetime points to
be concrete physical entities in particular. As Malament says, in the context of
discussing whether spacetime points are nominalist-friendly, “They certainly
are not concrete physical objects in any straight-forward sense. They do not
have a mass-energy content…. They do not suffer change. It is not even clear
in what sense they exist in space and time” (1982, 532). Others have worried
more generally that this kind of ontological dispute—a dispute that is just
about what things exist—is non-substantive or merely verbal.30 Howard Stein,
in discussing the spacetime debate, says that, “For me, the word ‘ontological’
itself presents seriously problematic aspects”; in particular, “Quine’s usage [is]
29See e.g. Field (1980, ch. 4); Mundy (1983); Earman (1989, 12); Brighouse (1994).
30This seems the spirit behind Stein (1970, 1977a), Curiel (2016), perhaps Belot (2011) and
some others in note 1; in a different way Wallace (2012). There have been similar thoughts in
metaphysics, for example in Hirsch (2011), but it’s not clear that this is exactly the same idea.
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not a very useful one for philosophy of physics” (1977a, 375).
As I see it, the debate is about the fundamentality of spatiotemporal struc-
ture, in particular about whether there is any spatiotemporal structure (fact)
not grounded in the structure of (facts about) material bodies, where the sub-
stantivalist says that there is and the relationalist says that there isn’t. Within
this framework, there is some exibility as to how exactly to put the dispute.
Neither the matching principle nor my conception of spatiotemporal struc-
ture says how we must construe the nature of spatiotemporal structure; and
I have not taken a stand on whether ground is primarily a relation between
objects or facts. As a result, although we can put the disagreement as being
about whether there exists a fundamental physical spacetime or fundamental
spacetime points, we do not have to. Anyone squeamish about putting things
in ontological terms can still see the debate as being about the fundamentality
of spatiotemporal structure, understanding this as being not about whether
there exist certain objects (over and above material bodies), but about whether
there are certain facts (over and above the facts about material bodies): the
relationalist says that the fact that a world has a certain spatiotemporal struc-
ture holds in virtue of the fact that material bodies behave thus and so; the
substantivalist denies this, seeing it as a fundamental fact about the physical
world. This allows us to discuss the dispute, and to evaluate the evidence
for either side, while remaining neutral on how the substantivalist wants to
understand the instantiation of that structure or the ontology behind this fact.
This dovetails with an idea in spacetime structural realism. Jonathan
Bain (2006) argues that classical eld theory (this includes general relativity),
standardly given in terms of a tensor formalism, can be formulated in ways
that do not presuppose a differential manifold of points. He describes three
alternative formalisms one could use (twistor theory, Einstein algebras, and
geometric algebra), none of which treat points as fundamental. My under-
standing leaves it open for the substantivalist to spell out the spatiotemporal
structure in any of these ways, or even to refuse to choose among them, as
Bain himself proposes. (Bain argues that we should be realists about spacetime
structure and not any particular instantiation of it. He sees this as a third view,
since according to him the substantivalist is committed to spacetime points,
but it counts as substantivalist by my lights.)
To be explicit, there are four different kinds of view that my conception of
substantivalism is meant to encompass, each of which holds that there are spa-
tiotemporal facts or structure not grounded in material bodies. First is what we
might call Bainianism, on which one is a realist about spatiotemporal structure
but not about any particular instantiation of it, i.e., not about any of the (non-
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material) objects that could be said to instantiate it. On this view, the different
possible descriptions or formulations or instantiations of spatiotemporal struc-
ture do not really differ from one another: one is an anti-realist about those.
Second is what we might call uncommitted substantivalism, on which one is a
realist about a particular instantiation of spatiotemporal structure—there is
a single best way of describing or formulating the spatiotemporal-structure
facts, in terms of a certain kind of non-material object—but one doesn’t know
what that instantiation or best formulation is; hence we cannot state the view
as propounding one or another such formulation. Third is what we might
call committed substantivalism, on which one is a realist about a particular
instantiation of spatiotemporal structure, one thinks that there is a best for-
mulation of it, and one does claim to know what it is; e.g., it might be the
one in terms of points (in which case the view approaches traditional sub-
stantivalism). Fourth is the “qualitativist” substantivalism of Dasgupta (2009,
2011), on which the fundamental spatiotemporal facts are purely qualitative,
not mentioning any entities at all; spacetime is not an entity but a “purely
qualitative structure.” One of the things I am claiming is that, when it comes
to the relational-substantival debate, we needn’t choose among these versions
of substantivalism. The argument in section 4 will support each of them in
the same way.
3.4. Something old, something new
There are too many different notions of “relational,” “substantival,” and
related concepts in the literature to survey them all here and compare them
to my own account.31 It should be clear that this is a non-standard conception
of the dispute, which captures core ideas behind more familiar conceptions,
both contemporary and traditional. For example, my understanding captures
the thought that the substantivalist believes in “the independent existence
and structure of space and time” (Sklar, 1974, 163)—that spacetime exists
“independently of material things…and is properly described as having its
own properties, over and above the properties of any material things that
may occupy parts of it” (Hoefer, 1996, 5)—so that “space is something as real
as matter and whose existence does not require matter, but which is not the
same stuff as matter” (Huggett, 1999, 129). It encompasses the idea that for
the substantivalist, “space-time points (and/or space-time regions) are entities
that exist in their own right” (Field, 1980, 34); “[s]pace is an entity in its own
right—a real live thing in our ontology” (Nerlich, 1994a, 3), a “genuine entity
31See the many notions listed in Horwich (1978); Friedman (1983); Earman (1989).
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of a fundamental kind” (Pooley, 2013, 526). These ideas are captured by
the claim that spatiotemporal structure is fundamental to the physical world.
There is spatiotemporal structure that is not grounded in, and is in that way
independent of, any material bodies.
My conception also captures the thought that the relationalist “denies
that space, or spacetime, is a basic entity, ontologically on a par with matter”
(Brown and Pooley, 2002, 183, n1), so that “the universe consists solely of
objects and events exemplifying various properties and relations” (Horwich,
1978, 397): “all that exists is material bodies” (Arntzenius, 2012, 153). As a
result, “all our talk of space and time can be reconstructed out of talk about
spatial relations between objects” (Brighouse, 1999, 60), and we “regard the
use physical theory makes of space-time and its geometrical structure merely
as a convenient way of saying something about the spatio-temporal properties
and relations of concrete physical objects” (Friedman, 1983, 216). These
statements are captured by the claim that spatiotemporal structure apart
from material bodies is nonfundamental; whereas certain material bodies, and
certain of their properties and relations, are fundamental.
At the same time, this is a non-standard, non-traditional take on things,
which allows us to sidestep many of the reasons people feel that the usual
dispute has stagnated or become non-substantive. Most importantly, it leaves
room for future physics to provide an answer, so that this dispute cannot
be “merely verbal” or “purely metaphysical.” We think that there is a real
difference between a world in which spatiotemporal structure is fundamental,
and one in which it arises from some pre-spatiotemporal structure, for instance.
Physicists treat these as genuinely different possibilities, governed by different
theories. This is evidence of a genuine difference between the views as I see
them.
Against tradition, I claim that the relationalist as much as the substantivalist
can recognize “absolute” or frame-independent facts about—quantities of,
structures that support—objects’ motions.32 In particular, it needn’t be the
case that “all motion is relative” for the relationalist, since there can be
objective facts about objects’ motions even in a world devoid of other material
bodies.33 The traditional question about the relativity of motion, then, is not
of primary concern.34 In addition, we needn’t distinguish the two views by
32Hoefer notes that traditional relationalism “is connected essentially to the denial of
absolute motion” (1998, 460).
33Huggett and Hoefer (2009) note other relationalist views denying the relativity of motion.
34This aligns with a similar shift away from that question in recent literature, exemplied
in Stein (1970, 1977b); Sklar (1974); Friedman (1983); Earman (1989); DiSalle (2006); Belot
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means of how they count possibilities, contrary to tradition as well as some
recent accounts.35 Further, against some other understandings of the dispute,
this one allows for both sides to believe in, to be realists about, spatiotemporal
structure.36 (I have argued that they both should do this, in order to respect
our usual inferences in physics.) I even leave it open for the relationalist
to posit the same spatiotemporal structure to a world as the substantivalist,
whereas some have taken the dispute to be over the relevant structure.37
My conception also avoids having to draw some of the distinctions that peo-
ple have been skeptical of. It does not require that we denitively distinguish
between container and contained, substance and non-substance, absolute and
relative, to name a few.38 There are three distinctions presupposed by my
understanding of the dispute, but they are not as unclear as those required
by more traditional conceptions. First, there is the distinction between the
fundamental and the nonfundamental. This is a distinction that we have a
reasonably clear pre-theoretic grasp of, clear enough to be useful here even
without spelling it out in more detail. Second, my conception requires that
we can identify what structure counts as spatiotemporal. This is something
that the physical laws give us a handle on, in ways discussed earlier, though I
admit that there is more that could be said. Perhaps there is nothing else that
makes some fact or structure spatiotemporal; perhaps there is.39 Either way,
I take the idea to be relatively familiar from physics. At least we have some
clear cases of spatiotemporal structures, such as those discussed here.
Third, my conception requires a distinction between material bodies and
other things in the world. Although people have worried about the clarity of
this distinction,40 I think that it is clear enough for our purposes. At the least,
I suggest that we understand the debate in this way, on the assumption that
we will be able to locate such a distinction. For now I follow Earman, who
says that, “It is a delicate and difcult task to separate the object elds into
those that characterize the space-time structure and those that characterize its
physical contents,” while also noting that “the vagaries of this general problem
(1999, 2000, 2011).
35Huggett (1999, ch. 8) discusses the traditional arguments. More recent examples are in
Earman and Norton (1987); Belot (2000).
36Statements intimating that the relationalist cannot believe in spatiotemporal structure
are in Field (1984, 34); Nerlich (1994a); Pooley (2013, 542); Maudlin (2012, 66).
37Earman (1989) suggests this at points.
38Rynasiewicz (1996, 2000) worries about the clarity of all these (and other) distinctions.
39Belot (2011) and Brighouse (2014) are two different accounts.
40See especially Rynasiewicz (1996).
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need not detain us here, since there are clear enough cases for our purposes”
(1989, 155-6). For those wanting argument that the distinction can generally
be made, I refer you to Carl Hoefer (1998) and also David Baker (2005).
One will nd, in contemporary discussions, the thought that the relation-
alist can believe in the existence of spacetime, understanding this as being
(somehow) constructed out of material bodies and their features. So it may
seem like even the traditional dispute (and contemporary versions of it) was
never about the existence of spacetime but its fundamentality, and my own
formulation may seem like just a new label for an old dispute. This how-
ever is something of an anachronism. Traditional participants, like Newton
and Leibniz, weren’t focused on questions of fundamentality: they were not
thinking explicitly in those terms. Neither, of course, were they thinking in
spatiotemporal terms. At the same time, to the extent that we can understand
what they were saying in these terms, this shows that my understanding is,
as I claim, an updating of the traditional dispute, using more recent devel-
opments in physics (involving spacetime and its structures) and philosophy
(fundamentality and ground).
4. An argument for substantivalism
I now suggest that if we do understand the debate in this way, then there is a
powerful argument for substantivalism, given much of current physics.
Above I argued that the relationalist should go partway41 toward adhering
to the matching principle by countenancing spatiotemporal structure, and that
she can do this by understanding all the facts about spatiotemporal structure
as being grounded in facts about material bodies. I am now going to argue
that really the relationalist can’t adhere to this principle, properly understood.
The argument differs from the more familiar charge that the relationalist
cannot countenance a particular spatiotemporal fact or structure.
Recall that the matching principle says to posit in the world the structure
presupposed by the laws. Posit physical structure in the world corresponding
to the mathematical structure needed to state the laws.
Now here is something else about the principle I haven’t yet mentioned.
It applies, in the rst instance, to the fundamental laws. (By saying “in the
rst instance,” I mean to indicate that the principle applies at least to the
fundamental laws, and that this is where we begin constructing our picture
41Partway, since I haven’t shown that the relationalist can ground the particular structure
needed.
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of the world from physics, in that we build a world “from the bottom up.”
I leave it open whether an analogous idea holds for nonfundamental laws.)
Given the fundamental laws, we should posit in the world the structure they
presuppose. This is clear from our usual inferences about spatiotemporal
structure. Assuming that Newton’s laws are fundamental, we infer a Galilean
structure to the world. From different fundamental laws, we infer a different
spatiotemporal structure—such as a Minkowskian structure for special rela-
tivity, a preferred-location spatial structure for Aristotle’s physics, or a variety
of different spatiotemporal structures for general relativity.
The matching principle also tells us to posit, in the fundamental level
of the physical world, whatever those laws presuppose. The fundamental
laws, after all, are about what’s fundamental. They don’t “care about” or
“know about” or mention the nonfundamental. I take it this is part of what
we mean when we say that they are fundamental. I also take it that this is
a familiar thought. (Michael Townsen Hicks and Jonathan Schaffer (2015)
call it orthodoxy.42) For example, it lies behind our dislike of quantum laws
that mention things like “measurement” or “the observer.” This isn’t to
deny that fundamental laws have consequences for nonfundamental things.
These laws yield predictions for nonfundamental phenomena when we plug
in initial conditions and use various bridge principles. On their own, though,
fundamental laws only mention or presuppose or know about things at the
fundamental level.43
Another way to see this comes from the idea of “the structure presupposed
by the laws.” The sense in which the laws presuppose or require some structure
is akin to an idea familiar from mathematics. In mathematics, we can dene
different levels of structure by starting with a lowest level, such as a set of
points, and then dening other objects that add more structure. These levels
of structure form a hierarchy. The ones “higher up” assume or presuppose
or constrain levels lower down, in that the higher-level objects cannot be
dened until the lower-level ones have been assumed or dened. For example,
think of adding differential structure to a topological space. This structure
indicates, from among the continuous curves specied by the topology, which
42They argue against the idea, concluding that fundamental laws can, and do, mention
nonfundamental properties. I agree that an alternative formulation can be useful in practice,
but I think that the best formulation won’t mention such things.
43This is different from Sider’s (2011, ch. 7) purity principle. Purity is a very general
principle about what the fundamental facts or truths can mention. (It says that they cannot
mention nonfundamental concepts.) The above is specic to the physical laws and what they
presuppose and therefore tell us about the physical world.
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ones are smooth to varying degrees. In this way the differential structure
assumes or presupposes a topology: it cannot be dened, it doesn’t make sense,
absent a topology. Higher-level structure is not similarly constrained by levels
lower down—as different metrics, or none at all, can be added to a differential
manifold. In other words, a given level of structure only “knows”—requires,
constrains, presupposes, assumes—things about that level and below.44
Analogously for the structure required by the physical laws. This structure
is presupposed by the laws in that it must be assumed in order for the laws to
be formulated or make sense. The laws don’t similarly know about—require,
constrain, presuppose, assume—higher-level structure. For fundamental laws,
the result is that they only know about fundamental structure. Note that the
fundamental laws may constrain things higher up in a different, metaphysical
sense: given the fundamental laws and ontology, everything else may be “xed”
in some sense. This is a different sense of constraining from the mathematical
notion, which concerns what is needed for something to make sense or be
dened. The other sense is a metaphysical notion that requires additional
metaphysical principles concerning the relation between different levels of
reality.
An example illustrates and motivates the primary reading of the matching
principle. Recall the discussion of non-time reversal invariant laws. Earlier I
said that if the laws are asymmetric in this way, then we infer an asymmetric
temporal structure in the world. The idea is that such laws presuppose this
structure, for they mention or presuppose a distinction between past and
future, by telling things to behave differently depending on the direction of
time. But there is more to the story. Take the second law of thermodynamics.
This law is not time reversal invariant, so it may seem to indicate an asymmetric
temporal structure. However, the second law of thermodynamics is not a
fundamental law. It doesn’t mention a system’s particles or other fundamental
constituents. It is formulated in terms of higher-level macroscopic quantities
like entropy. Whether to infer an objective past-future distinction in the
world then really depends on what fundamental theory accounts for the
second law, and whether that theory’s laws are symmetric in time. (It is natural
to think that if a past hypothesis account of thermodynamics is correct, then
there is no asymmetric temporal structure; whereas if a non-time reversal
invariant theory like GRW quantum mechanics is true [and able to account
44In mathematics one also talks of a higher-level structure “inducing” a lower-level one
(e.g., “the topology induced by the metric”). This makes it sound as though the higher-level
structure is dened rst and it then constrains the lower, but in fact it amounts to the above
idea (e.g., once we have dened a metric, there must already be implicitly a topology).
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for thermodynamics] then there is.45) The nonfundamental law on its own
does not tell us about fundamental temporal structure: it is too far removed
from the fundamental level to do that. Only a fundamental law can tell us
about this.
In other words: we posit fundamental structure in the world needed for
the fundamental laws. We recognize as fundamental the facts that are recog-
nized by the fundamental laws. The matching principle applies, in the rst
instance, to the fundamental laws and fundamental level of physical reality.
The matching principle as discussed in section 2 says that the world should
“look like” or “t” its laws. The primary reading of the principle says that the
fundamental level of the world should look like or t its fundamental laws.
Now to the argument for substantivalism. First notice that the kinds of
fundamental laws we are most familiar with are formulated to presuppose
spatiotemporal facts apart from material bodies. These laws mention or
presuppose a spatiotemporal structure in addition to material bodies and their
features. Newton’s laws presuppose a Galilean spatiotemporal structure in
addition to the existence of massive particles. These laws assume or require
that the world has this structure, just as the laws of special relativity assume
or require a Minkowskian structure. The laws of Aristotle’s physics mention
a preferred-location spatial structure in addition to the elements that move
toward their natural places. Similarly for the laws of general relativity, even
though they allow for different spatiotemporal structures. Think of the usual
way of understanding the eld equations, as saying how the distribution of
matter and energy relates to the spatiotemporal geometry, which in turn
affects the behavior of matter. These equations are formulated directly in
terms of—they mention or talk about—a spatiotemporal structure apart from
material bodies, coded up in the metric tensor, distinct from the stress-energy
tensor. (See Hoefer (1996, 1998) for arguments that the metric is most
naturally seen as characterizing a spatiotemporal structure that is not the
structure of a material eld. This is not uncontroversial, but is assumed in
standard presentations.) The fundamental laws that we are familiar with make
reference to material bodies, but they also presuppose or make reference to a
spatiotemporal structure apart from those bodies.46
45Albert (2000) discusses these two accounts. See North (2008) on why these conclusions
about temporal structure are natural.
46There is a difference between the laws mentioning and presupposing something. That
a law explicitly mentions something implies that the law presupposes it, but not vice versa.
The laws of general relativity explicitly reference both material bodies and spatiotemporal
structure. The usual Newtonian laws explicitly mention the former yet only presuppose
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Given that the fundamental laws are typically like this, a problem arises for
the relationalist. The problem is not that the relationalist doesn’t recognize
enough spatiotemporal facts for the physics, a concern lying at the root of
classic arguments like Newton’s, as well as many contemporary ones (see notes
23 and 25). Grant the relationalist enough stuff to ground those facts and
make the relevant predictions, and there is still a problem. According to the
core of the view, all the facts about spatiotemporal structure are grounded in
more fundamental facts about material bodies. The kinds of fundamental laws
we are used to, though, presuppose or mention spatiotemporal facts apart
from material bodies—facts that, for the relationalist, are nonfundamental.
This violates the principle that the fundamental level of the physical world
should contain whatever is needed for or presupposed by the fundamental
laws.
So the argument is this. First premise: the fundamental laws are about
what’s fundamental to the physical world; they refer to or presuppose things
about the fundamental physical level. Second premise: these laws are about,
they presuppose or refer to, a spatiotemporal structure, or spatiotemporal facts,
apart from material bodies. Third premise: for the relationalist, this kind of
structure or fact exists at a nonfundamental level, above that of material bodies.
Fourth premise: the primary reading of the matching principle. Conclusion:
relationalism is incorrect. Substantivalism posits the spatiotemporal structure
or facts needed for the laws at the fundamental level.
General relativity provides an example. This theory establishes a nomolog-
ical connection between material bodies and a spatiotemporal structure apart
from them. On their own, the laws do not say whether material bodies and
spatiotemporal structure are at the same level of physical reality, nor which is
more fundamental if not. Without some further principle, both relationalism
and substantivalism seem satisfactory: both recognize facts about material
bodies as well as a world’s spatiotemporal structure. Enter the matching
principle. The substantivalist does, the relationalist does not, adhere to it.
You may wonder why the spatiotemporal structure presupposed by the laws
is apart from material bodies, as premise 2 claims. After all, the relationalist,
in my view, can countenance this structure, but will say that it has to do with
the (actual and perhaps possible) spatiotemporal relations between material
the latter. (Hence a difference from Quine’s prescription [p. 9]: Newton’s laws, as usually
formulated, presuppose a Galilean spatiotemporal structure; they don’t explicitly mention or
quantify over that structure, which the matching principle tells us to posit.) This difference
does not matter here. We use the matching principle to infer structure in the world regardless
of whether it is explicitly mentioned or presupposed. Either way, the laws require it.
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bodies. In what way do the laws presuppose a spatiotemporal structure that
is in addition to material bodies? The answer comes from the way that the
fundamental laws are usually formulated. (I turn to potential reformulations
in section 5.) These laws are typically formulated to directly mention material
bodies, with a term that directly refers to them—such as the mass term of
Newton’s dynamics, or the mass density of some formulations of Newtonian
gravitation, or the elements mentioned in Aristotle’s laws, or the stress-energy
tensor of general relativity.47 At the same time, these laws also presuppose
that the world has a spatiotemporal structure apart from those bodies—apart
in that it is presupposed by the laws in the mathematical sense given above,
or else is directly mentioned by or coded up in a distinct term.
Recall that the matching principle tells us to infer that a special relativistic
world lacks an absolute simultaneity structure. The laws don’t require this
mathematical structure, which suggests that the world doesn’t have the cor-
responding physical structure. To fail to adhere to the matching principle
is to fail to heed this evidence from the laws about what the world is like.
The relationalist fails to adhere to the primary reading of the principle in the
same way. The fundamental laws are giving us evidence that spatiotemporal
structure is fundamental to the physical world, which the relationalist fails to
heed. The relationalist may respond that there are good reasons to disregard
this apparent evidence from the laws. The burden is then on the relationalist
to show this, just as the burden falls on the proponent of absolute simultaneity.
You might think that there are two distinct notions, that of what’s physically
fundamental versus metaphysically fundamental; that the matching principle
governs the rst whereas substantivalism and relationalism are views about
the second; and conclude that the argument from the matching principle
doesn’t make contact with those views. In particular, you might think it open
for the relationalist to say that spatiotemporal structure is metaphysically
nonfundamental, in accord with relationalism, yet physically fundamental, in
accord with the matching principle—that a world’s spatiotemporal structure is
less metaphysically fundamental than, but more physically fundamental than,
the spatiotemporal relations between material bodies. I suppose that such a
view is possible, but it seems implausible on its face. Imagine an analogous
reductionist who says that macroscopic systems (boxes of gas) are metaphysi-
cally nonfundamental, grounded in more fundamental microscopic objects
(their particles), yet physically fundamental. This is a puzzling view. Surely
47In the context of this debate, both views take certain material objects to exist at the
fundamental level. (Supersubstantivalism would then deny this.)
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the thought that microscopic objects are metaphysically fundamental goes
hand in hand with evidence from physics suggesting that they are physically
fundamental. Relative physical and metaphysical fundamentality cannot plau-
sibly go in opposite directions. More generally, I’m inclined to reject the idea
that there are two distinct notions of fundamentality here.
Suppose that what I have been calling “spatiotemporal structure” involves,
at least in part, facts that must be stated using universal generalizations. On a
standard axiomatic approach to geometry, for instance, a given spatiotemporal
structure will be dened via a universal generalization over a domain of points.
Suppose further that generalizations are not fundamental but grounded in
their instances, in accord with a familiar way of thinking about grounding.
Then it may seem as though the substantivalist doesn’t adhere to the matching
principle either, simply because spatiotemporal structure, qua generalizations,
cannot be fundamental. However, the substantivalist will avoid the worry,
for one of the following reasons. First, one might for independent reasons
think that generalizations are fundamental, a not-unprecedented (to my mind,
not implausible) view, even among grounding proponents. Second, even if
spatiotemporal-structure-qua-generalizations is not absolutely fundamental,
it is very close to being fundamental, so that the fundamental structure of the
world almost directly matches the structure for the fundamental laws. The
only “gap” there is between spatiotemporal structure and the fundamental
level is the one created by the gap between generalizations and their instances.
This is an intuitively smaller gap than that between a world’s spatiotempo-
ral structure and features of material bodies. The former is just a “gap in
logical form”—the “size” of the separation between a generalization and the
collection of particular claims that grounds it—whereas the latter is a larger,
physical gap. The substantivalist then adheres to the matching principle more
than the relationalist does. Finally, notice that even if the generalizations
that axiomatize a given structure are not absolutely fundamental, the various
facts about the points still can be, and these facts are included in my concep-
tion of spatiotemporal structure; in which case there are still fundamental
spatiotemporal facts or structure apart from material bodies.
(The worry also would also seem to go too far. It would force us to say that
no particular collection of fundamental facts is to be preferred to any other on
the basis of the physical laws, simply because any structure required for those
laws takes the form of a generalization, and no generalization is fundamental.
But surely a matching-type argument can sometimes work—as when we want
to say that Berkeleyan idealism posits a world that radically fails to match the
structure indicated by the laws. It seems we might reject that view for the
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reason that the fundamental nature of the world does not match the structure
for the laws—even though that structure is given by generalizations, and even
if generalizations are not fundamental but grounded in their instances.)
Notice that the argument for substantivalism is independent of one’s view
on the metaphysics of laws. The question of what makes a statement a law
is distinct from the injunction to posit, assuming that a certain statement is
a law, the requisite structure in the world. Even the Humean, who denies
that laws of nature are metaphysically fundamental, can agree to posit, in
the fundamental physical level of the world, the structure presupposed by
the fundamental physical laws. To put it another way, the content of the law
claim, the proposition p of the statement “it is a law that p,” is what indicates
structure in the world. It is irrelevant whether what makes it the case that p
is a law is itself metaphysically fundamental. Whatever your account of laws
of nature, you can, and should, adhere to the matching principle.
Current physics therefore gives us reason to believe that substantivalism
is correct. Nonetheless, it is open for future physics to turn the tide. If a
quantum theory of gravity or some other future fundamental theory contains
laws that only presuppose things about material bodies and their relations,
which in turn give rise to the spatiotemporal structure presupposed by current
theories, we can conclude that relationalism is correct. Future laws might even
suggest a view that doesn’t look like either relationalism or substantivalism,
presupposing facts about neither material bodies nor spatiotemporal structure
but something else. (A causal set theory approach to quantum gravity, for
example, might support relationalism, depending on the particulars, or it
could be a case on which neither view is correct.48) In this way the debate will
remain relevant to, and continue to be informed by, future developments in
physics.
5. A challenge for relationalism
Finally, let me turn to the question raised at the end of section 2. I have
been assuming that the fundamental laws we currently have are formulated
to presuppose a spatiotemporal structure apart from material bodies. This
reveals one other way for the tide to turn: the relationalist could try to
reformulate these laws to only presuppose things about material bodies. If
such a reformulation is possible, then the argument will turn on how we
48See Huggett and Wüthrich (2013) and the other papers in that journal issue on the
emergence of spacetime in quantum gravity.
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should generally formulate the laws, which is a big question that I can’t fully
answer here. Even so, the argument poses a signicant challenge to any
relationalist attempt to reformulate the laws.
Consider an illustrative example: the relationalist reformulation of New-
tonian mechanics initially suggested by Bas van Fraassen (1970, 4.1) and lled
out in one way by Nick Huggett (2006). According to their idea, we can
reformulate Newtonian mechanics to include the statement that, “Newton’s
Laws hold in some frames,” where these will be the inertial frames. (There is
also a force law, and on Huggett’s account a law about the spatial geometry.)
These laws then pick out a standard of inertia or straightness of trajectories—
they recognize a quantity of, or facts about, acceleration—without assuming
that spacetime exists. In my terms, they only presuppose spatiotemporal facts
about material bodies. This is because, according to Huggett, the facts about
inertial frames—indeed, all the spatiotemporal facts—themselves supervene
on facts about the history of relations between material bodies. (Huggett
rejects modal relationalism.) This is a genuinely relationalist formulation, on
my construal, which respects the primary reading of the matching principle.
The truth of the laws in certain frames effectively substitutes for an inertial
structure, so that the laws themselves do not have to mention or presuppose
this structure.
The problem is that this is a worse formulation of the laws, for a couple
of reasons. First, this formulation does not respect the idea that fundamental
laws only mention fundamental things. These laws are given in terms of facts
about inertial frames, which for Huggett are not fundamental but grounded
in facts about the relations between material bodies.
Second, this formulation is given in terms of reference frames. Why is
this worse? I take it that fundamental physical laws are best formulated in
terms of things about the world itself, and reference frames don’t t the
bill. According to Newton’s laws, inertial frames are like units of measure
or coordinate systems, in that a choice of frame is an arbitrary choice in
description. Now, Huggett’s formulation does not mention any particular
frame, nor does it directly mention inertial frames. Instead it says that there
are frames you can choose such that Newton’s laws are true.49 But the fact
that a choice of inertial frame is arbitrary suggests that inertial frames in
particular, and reference frames in general—these objects as a group or kind
of thing—are merely descriptive or labeling devices we use, not inherent in
49See Dorr (2010) for argument that “existential quantication as such is a distinctive source
of badness” (166; original italics).
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physical systems themselves50; hence they should not, other things equal,
be mentioned in the fundamental physical laws. I gather that this is what
underlies the general feeling in foundational discussions that formulating the
laws in geometric, coordinate-free terms is desirable. (Consider formulations
of classical mechanics in terms of so-called generalized coordinates, which
do not mention any particular coordinate system. Even this reference to
coordinates is seen as ideally replaceable by geometric objects with no mention
of coordinates.)
An idea from Hartry Field bolsters the thought that such a formulation is
worse in this way. Field draws a distinction between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’
explanations. The former “explain what is going on without appeal to extra-
neous” entities, things “extrinsic to the process to be explained” (1980, 43). As
a result, intrinsic explanations are better, more “illuminating” (1980, 43) or
“satisfying” (1989, 18). He says,
[E]xtrinsic explanations are often quite useful. But it seems to
me that whenever one has an extrinsic explanation, one wants
an intrinsic explanation that underlies it: one wants to be able to
explain the behaviour of the physical system in terms of the intrinsic
features of that system, without invoking extrinsic entities…whose
properties are irrelevant to the behavior of the system being ex-
plained. If one cannot do this, then it seems rather like magic that
the extrinsic explanation works (1989, 193; original italics).
The best explanations cite intrinsic features relevant to the system’s behavior.
By analogy to Field’s idea, call formulations of the laws in terms of refer-
ence frames or coordinate systems or the like “extrinsic formulations.” Extrin-
sic formulations are then worse for the same reasons Field says that extrinsic
explanations are worse: they reference things outside the system or world
itself, whose properties aren’t directly relevant to the system’s behavior.51
This makes the success of the formulation seem like magic. All things equal,
it is better to have an intrinsic formulation—or what I prefer to call a direct
formulation, since extrinsic entities, like coordinate labels, can tell us about the
50Compare Einstein on a coordinate system, which is “only a means of description and in
itself has nothing to do with the objects to be described” (2002, 203; original italics).
51Consider Field’s reason that a scientic explanation citing direct relations between
physical objects and numbers is extrinsic and therefore worse: “[T]he role of the numbers is
simply to serve as labels for some of the features of the physical system: there is no pretense
that the properties of the numbers inuence the physical system whose behaviour is being
explained” (1989, 192-3). The role of reference frames in physics is similar.
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system in question; only they do so in an indirect, and therefore less preferable,
way. It’s analogous to characterizing the geometry of the Euclidean plane by
saying that, “there are coordinate systems in which the distance formula takes
the usual pythagorean form,” rather than by giving the metric tensor (or, for
that matter, Euclid’s axioms). That characterization gives the structure of the
plane, but in a needlessly indirect way, by means of the kinds of coordinate
systems we can lay down on top of it. Better to have a formulation of the laws
that more directly reects reality. (It is not uncommon for physics books to
state the laws in terms of reference frames or coordinate systems. The claim
is that this is not the best formulation.)
Of course, direct formulations may seem preferable only if you are a realist
to begin with—only if you think that it is the job of a physical theory to tell
us what the world is like. An instrumentalist may be unbothered by indirect
formulations and extrinsic explanations. (The instrumentalist should be used
to the charge that the success of science seems like magic.) Since it is not
my aim to argue for realism here, I leave it to the anti-realist to parry the
objection that such formulations are worse. Let me note, though, that indirect
formulations seem particularly problematic for fundamental laws, since the
elements that feature in them, like reference frames or coordinate systems,
don’t seem the sorts of things that can be truly fundamental or explanatory.
There are other relationalist reformulations to consider in more detail
than I have space to do here. However, the above strikes me as indicative
of the kinds of problems that any such reformulation will face. In order for
relationalism to be victorious, the proffered reformulation must be genuinely
relationalist, presupposing facts only about material bodies; it should be direct;
and it should respect the primary reading of the matching principle.
A brief look at three more examples further suggests that a relationalist
reformulation meeting these constraints will be hard to come by. (1) Julian
Barbour’s relationalist mechanics (Barbour and Bertotti, 1982; Barbour, 1982,
2000, 2001), which eschews any fundamental temporal structure, arguably
presupposes a spatial structure above that of material bodies,52 in which
case the theory is substantivalist, on my understanding. Setting that aside,
the theory is not formulated directly.53 (2) David Albert (1996) suggests
that in classical mechanics, the Hamiltonian energy function gives rise to
a three-dimensional spatial structure. Since the Hamiltonian is dened in
52See the presentation in Earman (1989, 2.1, 5.2). Arntzenius (2012, 5.11); Pooley (2013,
6.2) suggest this for Barbour’s reformulation of general relativity in particular.
53The indirectness enters in recovering the topological temporal structure and the inertial
structure: Arntzenius (2012, chs. 1, 5).
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terms of particle features, this may count as a relationalist theory, on my
construal. (Albert is not arguing for relationalism.) Yet there is also a case to
be made that the mathematical formulation presupposes a spatial structure
apart from material bodies (in particular for the kinetic energy term), in which
case it would either count as substantivalist, or fail to respect the primary
reading of the matching principle. (3) Huggett mentions another law of his
reformulation of Newtonian mechanics: “‘There is an embedding of the
relational history into G’, for some specic Riemannian geometry G” (2006,
53), where for him the privileged embedding supervenes on the history of
relations between material bodies. Facts about the embedding geometry
(spatial structure) are not fundamental but grounded in facts about material
bodies. This makes the law relationalist. The problem is that it, too, explicitly
mentions nonfundamental things, and is formulated indirectly, in terms of a
structure into which the relations can be embedded. (A similar charge applies
to Albert’s (2012) suggestion for a relationalist Newtonian mechanics that
says: “The physically possible histories of inter-particle distances are those
which can be embedded in a full substantivalist Newtonian space, or imagined
as taking place in such a space, in such a way as to satisfy F = ma.”)
This does not prove that no relationalist reformulation can succeed, and
more work must be done to fully evaluate the various proposals on offer in
these terms.54 But it does suggest that it won’t be easy to nd a relationalist
reformulation that has the features we want of fundamental laws. Current
laws are generally formulated to presuppose a spatiotemporal structure apart
from material bodies. The problem is that typical relationalist substitutes for
that kind of structure—facts about things like reference frames or coordinate
systems or embedding geometries—are not candidates for direct formulations
of the laws. Future laws, however, may be different.
54A few more examples. On the dynamical approach of Brown (2005); Brown and Pooley
(2006), a world’s spatiotemporal structure holds in virtue of the behavior of material bodies
via the laws and their symmetries. This seems relationalist, on my conception (in particular
if the laws are grounded in facts about material bodies). They presumably reject my idea
that the laws presuppose a certain structure in order to be formulated. Another relationalist
theory is that of Belot (1999, 2000), which seems indirectly formulated (cf. Brown and Pooley
(2002, 192-93); it also presupposes a temporal structure apart from material bodies: Brown
and Pooley (2002, 194)). Another is that of Albert (2017), on which there is no fundamental,
pre-dynamical spatiotemporal structure: all spatiotemporal facts are grounded in facts about
the behaviors of material bodies. Albert reformulates the laws in an indirect way.
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6. Conclusion
Many people have thought that the arguments for relationalism or substantival-
ism will have to resort to considerations like simplicity, ontological parsimony,
or explanatory power.55 Some have said that the relationalist’s ontology is
more parsimonious, and therefore favored by Occam’s razor.56 Others have
said that the substantivalist’s theory is simpler, and therefore favored by or-
dinary criteria of theory choice.57 Some have argued that the relationalist’s
theory is more explanatory. Others have claimed that the substantivalist’s is.58
You might conclude that the debate is hopelessly vague, since the criteria
of simplicity, parsimony, and explanatory power needed to adjudicate it are
themselves vague; nor is it clear which to favor when these virtues compete.59
I don’t object to relying on such considerations even so, but it is worth noting
that the argument from the matching principle is different. The matching
principle doesn’t say to refuse to posit unnecessary entities or to go with the
simplest or most explanatory theory. It says to posit in the world the structure
presupposed by the laws. The argument based on this principle escapes those
particular worries about the status of the debate.
The matching principle is a familiar and successful guiding principle. It
applies, in the rst instance, to the fundamental laws and fundamental level of
physical reality. The substantivalist and relationalist, as I see them, disagree
about the fundamental physical level, which is why the matching principle can
distinguish between them. This is a substantive debate about the fundamental
nature of the world according to physics; a debate about what makes it the
case that the spatiotemporal structure required by the physics holds.
The traditional debate centered on whether we need to posit an indepen-
dently existing space in order to account for objects’ motions. The debate
that I have presented is a natural descendant: a debate about whether we need
55Dasgupta (2015) discusses the effects of these criteria on the spacetime debate for classical
physics.
56Huggett (2006); Huggett and Hoefer (2009); Pooley (2013).
57Huggett (2006); Arntzenius (2012, ch. 5).
58Earman (1989) suggests that the relationalist’s theory will be worse; Brown and Pooley
(2002) argue against this. Maudlin (1993, 196) says that the substantivalist’s theory is more
explanatory in some ways; Nerlich (1994a,b) argues that it is more explanatory in general.
59See Horwich (1978); Earman (1989, 3.3); Huggett (2006, 70) for this kind of complaint.
Sklar (1974, 231) notes a tradeoff between the substantivalist’s explanatory power and rela-
tionalist’s parsimony; Mundy (1983, 207) notes one between the relationalist’s parsimony and
substantivalist’s simplicity. Belot (2011) suggests that parsimony in fact favors substantivalism
(while arguing against using simplicity considerations to draw metaphysical conclusions).
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to posit a spatiotemporal structure apart from material bodies to support the
theory that best accounts for objects’ motions. This is a substantive debate,
which we currently have reason to believe the substantivalist is winning.60
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